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Abstract
The intensive care unit (ICU) is one of the most technically advanced environments in healthcare, using a multitude of
medical devices for drug administration, mechanical ventilation and patient monitoring. However, these technologies
currently come with disadvantages, namely noise pollution, information overload and alarm fatigue—all caused by too
many alarms. Individual medical devices currently generate alarms independently, without any coordination or priori-
tisation with other devices, leading to a cacophony where important alarms can be lost amongst trivial ones, occasionally
with serious or even fatal consequences for patients. We have called this approach to the design of medical devices the
single-device paradigm, and believe it is obsolete in modern hospitals where patients are typically connected to several
devices simultaneously. Alarm rates of one alarm every four minutes for only the physiological monitors (as recorded in
the ICUs of two hospitals contributing to this paper) degrades the quality of the patient’s healing environment and
threatens patient safety by constantly distracting healthcare professionals. We outline a new approach to medical device
design involving the application of human factors principles which have been successful in eliminating alarm fatigue in
commercial aviation. Our approach comprises the networked-device paradigm, comprehensive alarms and humaniform
information displays. Instead of each medical device alarming separately at the patient’s bedside, our proposed approach
will integrate, prioritise and optimise alarms across all devices attached to each patient, display information more
intuitively and hence increase alarm quality while reducing the number of alarms by an order of magnitude below
current levels.
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Introduction
Clinical alarms, patient monitoring systems and other
medical devices are currently based on a single-device
paradigm, in the sense that each device is designed to
operate in isolation and to generate alarms indepen-
dently at the patient’s bedside. In the context of
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modern high technology healthcare, where patients are
typically connected to several devices, the single-device
paradigm is outdated and routinely results in informa-
tion overload, distraction for healthcare professionals
and unnecessary audiovisual disturbances for patients.
At the Academic Medical Centre Utrecht and Erasmus
Medical Centre, the authors are working with equip-
ment manufacturers in order to develop a practical
solution to this problem which will substantially
reduce the total number of alarms and integrate trivial
alarms into comprehensive, more informationally
meaningful ones—and this represents a paradigm
shift in the way alarms in healthcare are currently
organised. Taking the human factors principles which
have been successful in eliminating alarm fatigue in
commercial aviation, our approach involves applying
these principles to the problem of alarm fatigue in
healthcare—yielding the networked-device paradigm,
comprehensive alarms and humaniform display of
patient information. The networked-device paradigm
involves connecting all medical devices in a virtual net-
work for each patient which, in combination with a
comprehensive alarm approach, can then be used to
manage and prioritise all alarm signals issuing from
individual devices. This approach is very different
from the current single-device paradigm, where no
management or prioritisation of alarms is possible
between all the devices connected to each patient.
Achieving such a global solution involves overcoming
a number of technical hurdles, and we outline the
approach we are currently pursuing in collaboration
with equipment manufacturers. We believe this
approach to the design of clinical alarms and medical
devices will yield a system capable of safely catering for
the healthcare needs of patients in modern hospitals.
Our aim is first to implement such an approach in the
intensive care unit (ICU), but the networked-device par-
adigm and comprehensive alarms are also equally appli-
cable in operating theatres, hospital wards and any other
care environment where medical devices are used.
The problem of too many alarms
in the intensive care unit
Audiovisual disturbances due to alarms in the ICU are
well known, adversely affect the psychological well-
being of patients, and significantly increase the work-
load for healthcare providers.1–3 The signalling mode
of alarms is designed to attract the immediate attention
of care providers by interrupting their current activi-
ties, resulting in cognitive stress.4,5 However, studies
demonstrate that 90% of alarms require no action
from healthcare providers.6 Noise levels in hospital
ICUs have been recorded at a mean of 71.9 dBA,
being equivalent to a busy office environment or the
use of a vacuum cleaner in the room,7 with peak noise
levels of 96 dBA,8 which is the equivalent of a propeller
plane flyover at 150 metres. In addition, Darbyshire
et al. reported that a significant proportion of loud
sounds originate from equipment near patients’ ears.4
Technological advancements have transformed
patient care in ICUs over recent decades. These
advancements include complex physiological monitor-
ing, continuous intravenous infusions of medications
and invasive treatments such as mechanical ventilation,
renal replacement therapy and extracorporeal life sup-
port. All these sophisticated technologies require con-
tinuous human oversight to monitor a patient’s
condition, interpret the displayed information and
adjust treatment accordingly. Yet, alarm design has
changed little in this time, and safety and useability
testing are conducted only at the level of the individual
device, rather than considering safety and useability at
the system level, comprising the many devices which
are typically connected to each patient.9
Manufacturers of these technologies currently meet
their legal and regulatory requirements by displaying as
much of the information considered useful to health-
care providers as possible on each device, and creating
the option to alarm every single parameter.10–12
Unfortunately, such sophisticated devices typically
operate independently from each other. Without any
coordination or prioritisation between devices, they
collectively issue a stream of alerts and alarms that
results in a cacophony where important alarms can
be lost amongst trivial ones, as many alarms are
caused by artifacts or are non-actionable. This quickly
leads to alarm fatigue and the habit of switching off
alarms in an attempt to manage them.13,14 Sampling
the alarms from only the physiological monitors in
the adult ICUs at the University Medical Centre
Utrecht and Erasmus Medical Centre resulted in the
recording of between 100 and 120 alarms per nurse
per eight-hour shift—or an average of one alarm
every four minutes. Adding the additional alarms of
the ventilator, infusion pumps, renal replacement ther-
apy or extracorporeal life-support devices would sub-
stantially increase this total. A recent study of this
problem reported from a single hospital in the USA,
with 77 intensive care beds, recorded the occurrence of
an astonishing 2,558,760 unique physiological alarms
during intensive care in a single month.15 Both the
Joint Commission and the Emergency Care Research
Institute (ECRI) have repeatedly identified alarm
safety issues, including alarm fatigue, as patient safety
hazards, which are known to be regularly associated
with patient deaths. Between 2005 and 2010, 566
alarm-related patient deaths were reported to the US
Food and Drug Administration.16–18
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Human factors design and the aviation industry
Alarm fatigue is a form of information overload, which
is a well-studied topic in aviation.19,20 This problem has
been dealt with in the aviation industry through many
iterations of system redesign over the years in the pur-
suit of safety and reliability. At the beginning of the
20th century, the many sensors, clocks and displays in
large aircraft required multiple personnel (pilots, a nav-
igator and a flight engineer) to monitor and operate
aircraft systems. In contrast, the cockpits of modern
aircraft are now sufficiently automated and the infor-
mation is structured in such a way that the cognitive
load can be handled by the pilots alone without a flight
engineer or navigator on the aeroplane.21,22 In modern
aviation, the alarm fatigue problem is carefully man-
aged by engineers and pilots working cooperatively to
agree upon exactly what needs to be alerted to the pilot
from all aircraft systems and what does not. Agreed
alarms are then placed in a hierarchy, with many
events being reported only as ‘cautions’ or ‘advisories’
on a screen, but without any auditory alert. This allows
pilots to deal with the fundamental needs of flying the
plane, rather than being continuously distracted by
alarms. Crews are typically able to manage one issue
at a time—the one with the currently highest priority—
and determine their mitigation strategy. Even an event
as apparently serious as an engine failure in a modern
commercial multi-engine aircraft does not result in a
top-level alarm with an auditory alert, but only a cau-
tion. This is in stark contrast to the multitude of trivial
alarms that constantly sound in the ICU.10
The healthcare literature contains ongoing efforts to
improve the quality of clinical alarms and how they are
presented. However, the great majority of these efforts
remain consistent with the single-device paradigm, as
they typically involve signal and algorithm optimisa-
tion within individual devices or for specific sets of
parameters.23,24 While improved specificity and artifact
reduction in a number of areas have been achieved with
these approaches, they offer little ability to manage or
prioritise alarms between devices for all devices
attached to a patient.24–26 By ignoring the information
from other devices and systems, these approaches can
only attempt to perfect the nature and presentation of
alarms from within the single device, rather than
understanding the alarm within the wider clinical con-
text associated with a particular patient. This implies a
false dichotomy in alarm processing: an alarm is either
wrong (no priority) or right (highest priority), rather
than considering the alarm as information with a par-
ticular priority relative to many other alarms.
Nonetheless, such approaches are important steps to
achieve our shared goal of higher-quality alarms and
should be considered, but we believe that the total
number of auditory alarms in the ICU must be reduced
by at least one order of magnitude from current levels,
and this is not possible under the single-device para-
digm. The networked-device paradigm, by contrast,
considers alarm design from a systems perspective,
which looks beyond individual devices. The same
alarm signals can be issued by individual medical devi-
ces, but rather than alarming at the bedside, alarm
signals will be passed to the network, which will then
manage and prioritise alarms across the entire network,
thus having the ability to reduce spurious audible
alarms significantly.9,27,28 Many medical devices
already have Wi-Fi capability and some capacity for
sharing information, and industry frameworks for inte-
grating medical devices have been developed.29,30 Even
without hardware changes, many of these devices are
capable of being networked and integrated further,
only requiring relatively straightforward software
changes. As the networked-device paradigm includes
devices from various manufacturers, international
communication standards and protocols are necessary
to ensure a safe and reliable network.31 Hence, we are
working with equipment manufacturers to align com-




However, creating virtual networks of devices is not
enough—an effective strategy for the management
and prioritisation of alarm data is critical within the
networked-device paradigm—since if done poorly, a
network of devices could lead to just as many if not
more alarms than the conventional approach.33 In
applying a similar design strategy as used in the avia-
tion industry to manage alarms, we have to consider
what information is necessary to understand what is
happening to our patients so that we can keep them
safe and guide them towards recovery. However, avia-
tion is a different industry from healthcare. Pilots have
almost full control over a single airplane from within
the cockpit, whereas ICU work processes are more
fragmented between devices, locations and different
team members. Although the designed solution in avi-
ation cannot be directly adopted by the ICU, the
underlying design principles can be. In other words,
we need to identify the fundamental needs to maintain
situational awareness in healthcare providers during
patient care. An overload of information will result in
a loss of situational awareness. So, we need to prioritise
the available information and then restrict it to an
amount that can be dealt with by the healthcare pro-
vider. All other information should be available only
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on demand or via notifications on a screen without
auditory alerts. For example, seeing the multiple elec-
trocardiograph (ECG) lead traces might be a high pri-
ority in a patient with ischaemic heart disease.
However, for someone with a respiratory problem,
the second ECG lead may be of less importance to
maintain situational awareness. Similarly, a septic
patient may initially suffer from severe haemodynamic
instability, whereas that same patient may be much
more stable after several days. We thus need to
design a system-wide solution which allows for deci-
sions to be made about what information has what
priority in which situation.
Hide secondary information: Automate
monitoring and alarming
Information can be hidden, or reported by silent noti-
fications, if ICU nurses and physicians know that it is
safe to do so, creating a healing and quiet patient envi-
ronment. A computer system may provide such safety
when it continuously monitors clinical information,
and produces an auditory alarm in a timely way only
when patients cross a threshold and deteriorate. The
monitored data can be hidden until the threshold is
crossed because the healthcare providers can consider
it to be safe by default. For example, when lung-
protective tidal volumes are achieved with acceptable
ventilatory pressures, CO2 levels and SpO2 levels, there
may be no need to display this information. However,
we need to consider the safety at a system level rather
than at the level of individual devices. Current solu-
tions use simple alarm thresholds within individual
devices; a parameter that goes out of bounds on each
device will trigger an alarm to which a healthcare pro-
vider needs to respond. This results in most alarms in
an ICU being either false or non-actionable, thus great-
ly increasing the number of alarms and alarm
fatigue.34,35 Widening alarm thresholds—or even filter-
ing particular alarms completely—may at first appear
to be an obvious approach to reduce the number of
false positive alarms. Unfortunately, a system with
wider alarm thresholds is likely to be less safe due to
the system being less sensitive to changes in the
patient’s condition. ICU nurses and physicians may
thus feel less comfortable with information not being
in direct sight if alarm thresholds are widened without
any other safeguards being in place.35
An alternative approach would be to find the optimal
set of alarm thresholds for all individual parameters of
ICU devices. This may be reasonably straightforward in
healthy patients, as the normal range of their physiolog-
ical parameters will be far from that of a diseased
patient, thus allowing differentiation of normal from
diseased states. This approach is analogous to the set-
ting of thresholds in aviation; the flight crew starts out
with a well maintained or ‘healthy’ aircraft for which
clear alarm thresholds can reasonably be inferred.
However, the situation in healthcare is much more com-
plex, and a more subtle variation on the aviation alarm-
setting approachmust be taken. Critically ill patients are
continuously in a diseased state which changes in its
Figure 1. The green line indicates the mean blood pressure of a theoretical healthy patient, who requires only a single threshold set
over the full time span (yellow dashed line indicates moderate severity threshold, and the red dashed line the severe alarm
threshold for each trace). The blue trace indicates the blood pressure of a theoretical diseased patient with multiple alarm thresholds
set over time.
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severity over time. The physiological values that can be
considered safe will greatly depend on the diagnosis, the
clinical condition of the patient and his or her comor-
bidities.26,36,37 The safety limits of an automated patient
monitoring system must therefore be dynamic, not
static, and need to adapt or be able to be adjusted to
an alternative set of thresholds to suit the clinical con-
dition of the patient (Figure 1) in collaboration with
healthcare providers.
The complementarity of humans
and machines
Healthcare providers understand the context of clinical
events very well but, like all human beings, have a lim-
ited attention span and workload capacity. Alarm sys-
tems can monitor many variables closely and
continuously and without fatigue but have no under-
standing of the context of events. The solution is to
Figure 2. Mock-up of handheld app which could help the healthcare provider to focus attention on the current points at risk using a
humaniform display.
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integrate and prioritise the information from the vari-
ous devices in order to reduce the total number of
alarms and have only the most relevant alarms sound
at any given time.
Comprehensive information
If we integrate the information from all devices in the
ICU, we could design systems that display the informa-
tion to healthcare providers in a much more efficient and
intuitive way, not only by hiding parameters with a lower
priority, but also by combining parameters and integrat-
ing these data into more comprehensive and meaningful
sets of information. For example, all respiratory and ven-
tilatory parameters—including laboratory values, radiol-
ogy reports and even breath sounds—could be integrated
into a summary status of the clinical condition of the
lungs (see an exemplar tablet interface with body over-
view or humaniform display; Figure 2). In a recent study,
physicians and nurse anaesthetists recalled significantly
more patient vital signs and reported a reduction inwork-
load when parameters were presented in a humaniform
visual representation compared with conventional dis-
play methods.38
Comprehensive alarms
The alarms in current ICU devices are generated by
each device when their values pass either the moderate
threshold (yellow alarm) or the severe threshold (red
alarm; Figure 1). The message of the alarm seems
simple, for example ‘red alarm: blood pressure low’.
However, the message does not necessarily reflect the
impact on the patient: a red alarm for low blood pres-
sure may not reflect a similar impact as a red alarm for
the detection of asystole on the ECG. Alarm notifica-
tions need to be more comprehensive, better prioritised
and clinically informed in order to support the situa-
tional awareness and decision-making of healthcare
professionals. Other work has attempted to suppress
alarms and combine data streams but without engaging
with clinicians on how this should occur.39 Under the
networked-device paradigm, new smarter algorithms,
operating across individual devices at the system
level, are needed to achieve this. These smarter algo-
rithms are currently being created through consultation
with clinical experts.40 However, in the future, such
algorithms could also include approaches using
machine learning and artificial intelligence techniques,
making use of real patient data in offline big datasets
and then applied to live patient devices, but only after
appropriate safety testing.20,25,27
When all available parameters from all available
devices are combined into a system of comprehensive
alarms, these can be better prioritised within the work
process of the healthcare provider, resulting in substan-
tially fewer but more meaningful alarms (see Figures 2
and 3). Appropriate assignment of priority will result in
many alarms being reduced to simple notifications
without auditory alerts (theoretical case 3; Figure 3),
Figure 3. Three theoretical patient case timelines visualising the notifications that are being sent to the healthcare provider in both
the current alarm system and in a future comprehensive alarm system. Case 1: An accidental disconnection from the ventilator (a
potentially life-threatening event). Within the current system, the patient monitor and ventilator would generate a series of alarms
that are not more informative than a single disconnection alarm. A comprehensive alarm system would generate only a single
disconnection alarm unless the clinical condition deteriorates. Case 2: A blocked intravenous line due to a distal occlusion. As multiple
inotropes are connected to the same line, the inotrope infusion will be reduced. Rather than alarming for each individual drug, the
comprehensive system will inform the nurse that the inotropes line is blocked and will escalate that alarm to a higher priority when
the patient is affected (a drop in blood pressure). Case 3: In the current system, all infusion pump alarms are communicated with
medium to high priority. A comprehensive system would understand that the end of the infusion of paracetamol is not an alarm and
should not have priority in demanding attention from the nurse with an auditory alarm.
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or to a single auditory alarm instead of many (theoret-
ical case 2; Figure 3). The system will be able to be
more informative in its messages and may even be
able to suggest an appropriate course of action to the
healthcare professional in various circumstances, since
integrated patient data yield a more reliable overall
picture of the state of the patient’s health (Figure 2).
A system that accurately prioritises information across
the network of devices attached to the patient is a
system that can not only send notifications at appro-
priate times, but also knows when to withhold unnec-
essary information and be silent. Such an approach for
the settings of the priority for the alarms and alerts of
individual patients can also be applied across a net-
work of many patients while still considering the clin-
ical specifics of each. A system of comprehensive
alarms could also be able to set alarm thresholds
dynamically (Figure 1).37 Furthermore, notifications
should be sent directly to the correct provider.
Sounding an alarm in a patient room when no health-
care professional is present is an unnecessary distur-
bance for patients and their families—and device
standards already exist which allow alarm information
to be forwarded elsewhere in this way.41
Safe systems not only safe devices
A systems approach to the design of ICU safety
requires that we view the various medical devices as a
network of sensors or an Internet of Things, instead of
an arbitrary collection of isolated devices.9,26,33,42,43
The current legal standards in Europe—the Medical
Device Directive and the Medical Device
Regulations—remain based on the old paradigm of
single-device safety.11,44 For example, these standards
dictate that an infusion pump alarm should be gener-
ated by the device at the bedside of the patient and
needs to be at least 45 dBA for one minute.45 This
technically prohibits a systems approach to patient
safety and alarm design, as it views the medical devices
as independent alarm generators rather than sensors
connected to a network. By contrast, under the
networked-device paradigm, alarms should be generat-
ed only after data integration from all devices and if the
event is warranted as sufficiently high priority, and this
will require a chain of devices and steps (Figure 4). This
requires the manufacturers of the different medical
devices to cooperate and accept that there has to be
bidirectional communication between the devices to
create distributed alarm systems and the possibility of
remote control of devices (consistent with existing ini-
tiatives such as Service Oriented Connectivity and
Integrating the Healthcare Enterprise).46,47 Current
regulations lag behind these more progressive connec-
tivity initiatives and so represent a challenge for device
manufacturers. However, hospital purchasers who
require such safe system features to be in their devices
will apply market pressure to manufacturers to make
such changes. The alarm features of individual devices
could be kept once they have been networked. In the
short term, this could be done for regulatory expedien-
cy, but in the longer term, this could act as a fail-safe in
the unlikely case of network failure, or for the less
likely situation where the device is indeed used in iso-
lation. In the longer term, regulatory changes will occur
Figure 4. Patient-centred care must be organised around the
patient. Safety is critically important and under the networked-
device paradigm, the whole chain of devices acts together
like an Internet of Things. EMR: electronic medical record;
PDMS: patient data management system; UI: user interface.
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to reflect better the needs of patients and clinicians in
modern hospitals and of medical device design. Full
compatibility between medical devices is technically
possible, even when devices are made by different man-
ufacturers, as is the case in aviation where components
of an aircraft cockpit can be made by various manu-
facturers to exacting specifications in order to maintain
compatibility.
Cooperative redesign
Ultimately, a departure from the single-device para-
digm implies that all involved parties—patients, health-
care professionals, device manufacturers, vendors and
the regulatory bodies—need to work together to design
safe patient alarms at a systems level. This requires
cooperation similar to that which occurred between
pilots and engineers during the design process that
led to the creation of the modern commercial aircraft
cockpit. Such a cooperative process in healthcare will
ultimately require a shift in the roles and responsibili-
ties of many individual parties.
The second and more major shift of the networked-
device paradigm involves changes in the assignment of the
responsibility for safety. The current process of safe design
and legislation predominately places the technical respon-
sibility with the medical device manufacturers. The
responsibility of using such medical devices to deliver
safe healthcare lies with the healthcare professionals.
However, in order to design safe alarms at a systems
level, technical and medical safety become much more
intertwined. In our aviation example, the redesign of the
cockpit has been accompanied by operational safety ini-
tiatives, such as briefings, checklists and crew resource
management.19,48–50 Also, the medical expert needs to
take a greater responsibility for understanding the
output of the entire chain of integrated devices. This is
only a small extension of what clinicians already do in
terms of accounting for the medical context and consid-
ering possible artifacts when several medical devices are in
use.
Conclusion
Our current clinical alarm and patient monitoring sys-
tems are outdated, and routinely result in information
overload for healthcare professionals and unnecessary
audiovisual disturbances for patients. A paradigm shift
in the way medical device alarms are designed is over-
due, and healthcare professionals, device manufac-
turers, vendors and policymakers need to appreciate
that our current patient data infrastructure is still
based on a single-device safety paradigm which is
now obsolete in modern hospitals. As healthcare pro-
fessionals, we need to work together with patient
organisations, suppliers of medical devices and infor-
mation technology infrastructure staff. This process
has begun at the Academic Medical Centre Utrecht
and Erasmus Medical Centre. We believe the future
of all clinical alarms, patient monitoring systems and
medical devices lies in the networked-device paradigm,
comprising comprehensive alarm notification systems
and the integration, prioritisation and optimisation of
patient information across multiple devices. Such an
approach has substantial potential to improve the qual-
ity and safety of patient care and the working condi-
tions of healthcare personnel.
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